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ARGUMENT
POINT I
NEITHER THIS COURT NOR THE LOWEi COURT MAY
SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THE|JUDGMENT
OF THE CLEARFIELD CITY COUNCIL.
Respondent in its Brief agrees with that portion of the
standard of review that a court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the legislative body of the municipality.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 9 ) . However, Respondent then states that
because this action is "equitable" the normal appellate standard
of review in equitable cases must be applied.
Brief, pp. 10-11).

(Respondent's

This latter statement is incorrect.

While it is true that in the instant pase certain equitable
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procedures were utilized in order to enforce the judgment of the
court this does not make the lower court's decision a strictly
equitable case as now contended by Respondent.

Essentially, the

lower court is not empowered to try the zoning matter as a trial
de novo but is reviewing the decision of the city governing
body on the basis of arbitrary and capricious action.

Thus, this

type of proceeding is in the nature of an appeal rather than an
original equitable proceeding.
In the cases cited by Respondent the lower court was the
original trier of fact and was therefore vested with a great deal
of discretion and a presumption of validity also vested with the
trial judge.

In the instant case, however, the original decision

maker was the Clearfield City Council and the same presumption of
validity must be given to that body.
In Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685
P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) a property owner appealed the decision of
the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment denying his requested
variance for a lot on which he had built a duplex.

A Third

District Court Judge ordered the Board to grant the variance and
the City appealed.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the lower

court judgment and ordered the City decision to be reinstated.
The Court noted that while a lower court is free to take
evidence in a matter involving zoning questions "this does not
mean that the hearing in the District Court should be a retrial
on the merits, or that the District Court can substitute its
judgment for that of the Board."
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Id. at 1034.

In reversing the lower court decision the Supreme Court
noted that the trial judge had improperly viewed his role in the
proceeding.

The Court stated:

In the case at hand, the Distri ct Judge undertook
to weigh anew the underlying factual considerations.
While there may have been some evidence in the record
to support the trial judge's findings, it was not his
prerogative to weigh the evidence an|lew. His role was
limited to determining whether there was evidence in
the record to support the Board of Adjustment's
action.

The judge made it clear that he thought retention
of low-cost housing, regardless of zoning
considerations, should be the overriding policy in
Salt Lake City. However, it does nop matter whether
the judge agrees or disagrees with the rationale of
the Board or the policy grounds upon which a decision
is based. It does not lie within the prerogative of
the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Board where the record discloses a reasonable
basis for the Board's decision. Id. at 1035.
Other courts in numerous states support the position that
this Court is not bound in any manner by the findings of the
lower court and must view the evidence submitted at the Council
hearing or supplemented in the lower courtq proceeding to
determine the actions of the governing bodly and not the actions
of the lower court.

The Arizona Supreme Cburt has held that the

rule stating that a trial court will be upheld if there is
evidence in support of the judgment is not applicable in zoning
cases.

In addition, the trial court's conclusions as to the

validity of zoning ordinances are not binding upon the appellate
court if the record on appeal shows the question was debatable.
City of Phoenix v. Oglescy, 537 P.2d 934 (Ariz.
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1975).

See also, City of Phoenix v. Price, 500 P.2d 1132 (Ariz.
App. 1972) (trial court's findings and conclusions as to
reasonableness of zoning ordinances were not binding on Court of
Appeals if record showed question was "debatable").
The Supreme Court of Kansas has stated that the question
whether an action of the zoning body was reasonable or not is one
of law and not of fact and thus the Supreme Court in reviewing
the trial court's decision must make the same review of a zoning
authority's action as does the trial court.

Neither court is

free to make findings of fact independent of those explicitly or
implicitly found by the city governing body.

The court is

limited to determining whether the facts could reasonably have
been found by the zoning body to justify its decision.
Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978).
Likewise, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that in
determining whether a city's decision not to rezone is
unreasonable the Supreme Court must look beyond the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and consider the basic physical
facts appearing in the record to ascertain the reasonableness of
the city's actions and whether they are fairly debatable.
Garrett v. City of Oklahoma City, 594 P.2d 764 (Okla.
1972).
Respondent seems to imply that the lower court's function
was that of a trier of fact to determine the credibility of the
witnesses.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 11). Respondent argues that

the lower court by viewing the witnesses personally could have
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determined the "real reasons" why the pezfmit was not granted.
Essentially, therefore, Respondent is stating that a lower court
judge must not only examine the various f|actors given by a city
council for denying a zoning request but must also view the
evidence in order to determine which of t|he factors were the
"real" reason a request has been denied.
Such an argument misses the standard of review in these* type
of cases.

A councilman, for example, may have five reasons for

voting against a proposed zoning change.

It is not necessary for

the city to prove that each of these reasons in and of themselves
is reasonable for the denial of the request.

Rather, it is only

necessary to show that at least one of thf reasons is sufficient
to justify the actions of the city body.

It is only when there

is no rational basis based upon any claimed reasoning that a
court can reverse the decision of a governing body and require
the city to take contrary action.
For this reason, therefore, the equitlable standard argued by
Respondent in its Brief is inapplicable to this case and should
not be applied to any of the substantive a Irguments which will now
follow.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE CLEARFIELD C±TY COUNCIL
AND THE CLEARFIELD CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
TO DENY A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT TO THE
PLAINTIFF WAS BASED UPON RATIONAL REASONING
AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS
Respondent in its Brief argues that the various reasons
stated throughout the City proceedings are invalid for the denial
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of a permit and that the lower court was therefore correct in
concluding that the City action was arbitrary and capricious.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-18).

Respondent has chosen to select

statements made by various City council members during the
numerous hours of testimony and to base its argument on these
isolated statements.

Again, as noted in Appellants' opening

brief, it is not necessary for Appellant to justify every reason
given during the City proceedings by every member of the
governing body.

The burden is simply to show that the decision

was based upon some rational basis as was presented to that
body.
For example, Respondent cites the case of Horbal v. City
of Ham Lake.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 13). The court in that

case carefully went through all of the reasons listed by the city
council in rejecting the permit and concluded that none of the
reasons were valid.
Respondent has failed to even acknowledge the existence of
the Addiction Recovery Center which had previously been
constructed at the site.

Respondent has failed to address the

contention made by several members of the council that it would
be against the community interest to place two of these type of
facilities adjacent to each other rather than creating a distance
between them.

Respondent has failed to address the cases cited

by Appellants upholding the separation of facilities as a valid
reason for rejecting a permit.
37-38).
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(Appellants' opening brief, pp.

Appellants relied upon the case of si ullivan v. City of
Pittsburgh, 617 F. Supp. 1988 (D. Pa. 1985) in its opening
brief.

(Appellants' Brief, p. 37). Respondent has cited the

same case in its Brief.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 20). The court

in that case, while requiring that a facility be allowed to be
put into the city did so since it was not within a close
proximity to existing facilities.

The court stated:

To the extent that the number of group homes in
the City of Pittsburgh is a legitimate concern,
defendant legislated this concern by prohibiting the
location of a group residence facility within one-half
mile of another group residence, a group care
facility, an institutional facility or an out-patient
drug and alcohol clinic, and by prohibiting the
location of a group care facility within one-quarter
mile of such facilities or clinics. ARC's
applications are not inconsistent wit[h this legitimate
requirement. Id. at 1498.
Thus, while some of the statements mdde by the various
council members concerning their individual reasons for rejecting
the application may or may not be proper, the record as
established during the City Council meeting shows that one of the
primary concerns was the proximity of this facility next to the
existing one.

As stated previously, in theb opening brief, this

concern was legitimate and the City was nott required to place two
of these types of facilities next to each other any more than it
would have been required to place two or three banks next to each
other since clustering clearly impacts on the surrounding area.
To require such adjacent placement effectively would eliminate
the purpose of a conditional use permit and would convert the
zoning into a permitted use zone.
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Respondent also argues that if the decision of the lower
court is reversed, "the future of the mental health delivery
system is dramatically jeopardized since its continuing
effectiveness is contingent upon successful integration into the
neighborhood setting."

(Respondent's Brief, pp. 16-17).

As was noted in Appellants' opening brief the Utah State
Legislature has specifically enacted a statute for the purpose of
protecting handicapped persons and in requiring cities to
establish areas for facilities to house them.

§10-9-2.5 U.C.A.

However, the Legislature specifically excluded under the
definition of handicapped persons people who were being treated
for alcoholism or drug abuse.

These are the exact type of people

which Davis County is proposing to place in the new facility.
While Respondent characterizes the residents as "mentally ill"
(Respondent's Brief, p. 16) it is more correct to define these
individuals as recovering from alcohol and drug dependency
problems together with any other mental health problems they may
have suffered as a result of their addictions.
It would seem, therefore, that if alcohol and drug addicts
are to receive special consideration in zoning ordinances enacted
by municipalities that such consideration should be directed to
the State Legislature and not to this Court.

If the policy

reasons for establishing these facilities is equal to or even
greater than the reasons for establishing handicap facilities
then the State Legislature should pass a similar law.

Again,

however, it should be kept in mind as observed in Appellants'
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opening brief, that even the present statute relating to
handicapped individuals allows for a distance of one mile between
existing facilities.
Respondent asks the Court to examind the case of
Northwest Residence, Inc.

v. The City ofi Brooklyn Center,

352 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. App. 1984).

(Respondent's Brief, p. 17).

It is appropriate to note that in that case the Court of Appeals
for Minnesota once again stated that "a reviewing court must make
an independent examination of a city council decision without a
according any special deference to the same review conducted by
the trial court." Id. at 767.

This statement is in accordance

with the standard of review previously noted by Appellants.
In addition, the Northwest Residence case involved a
special use permit for mentally ill adults.

The court found that

the legislature had specifically enacted Statutes for the
protection of this type of individual and that municipalities
could not circumvent this state law by lodal ordinances.
at 772*773.

Id.

Again, this type of state statutory enactment is not

present here.
While admittedly there were numerous concerns of many people
during the City Council and City zoning he|arings it is not
critical for the purpose of this appeal to validate each and
every reason expressed by each individual.

Rather, the question

is simply whether there was enough evidence to support a rational
basis for the the decision of the City Council.
Appellants do not dispute that the argument raised
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by the County concerning the need of this facility is valid or
that many of the concerns expressed by some members of the
Council and the audience were irrelevant to the issue.

On the

other hand, as long as the question of granting the permit was
"fairly debatable" [Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528
(Ariz.

App.

1985)] then this Court must affirm the

municipality's decision since it cannot substitute its own
judgment for that of the elected city representatives.

The lower

court was, therefore, in error in reversing the decision of this
governmental body when there was substantial reason existing to
support the decision,
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
CLEARFIELD CITY HAD ACTED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER.
Appellants in their opening brief contended that the
District Court erred in concluding that the Council and Planning
Commission had acted unconstitutionally in the application of the
ordinance.

(Appellants' Brief, pp.

41-45).

Respondent contends

that the City in fact did apply the ordinances in an
unconstitutional manner.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.

18-21).

Respondent has cited three cases in support of its position: City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center; J.W.

v. City of Tacoma,

Washington; and Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh.
The Cleburne Living Center case and the J.W. case were
addressed initially in Appellants' Brief.

Both of these cases

involved ordinances which had been enacted for the purpose of
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requiring special conditions to be made by persons who were
mentally retarded or were former mental patients.

The courts in

Cleburne and J.W. found there was no rational basis for enacting
these ordinances as directed at these groups of individuals-

In

the instant case, of course, there is no similar ordinance in
that the ordinance relied upon by the County pertains to all
facilities including group homes, banks, restaurants, etc.
These cases, stand for the propositilcon that a city may in
fact enact ordinances directed towards ce|irtain groups of
individuals if there is a rational basis for making that
distinction.
the J.W.

As noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in

case:

Other groups of persons burdened by the Tacoma
ordinance, such as parolees, may be situated
significantly differently. Although the record before
us in this case does not address the issue, it is
conceivable that community fears concerning such
groups may rest on a sound factual basis. . . . Each
group must, of course, be considered[in light of its
own peculiar circumstances. 720 F.2q 1126, 1129 fn.
2.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Cleburne focused its attention
on the "feeble minded" but did not state tjhat the community was
not empowered to regulate other groups of individuals such as
alcoholic or drug addicts or penal or corrkectional inmates.
In addition, neither Cleburne nor J.Wj.. involved an
application to place two facilities together such as in the
instant case.

In addition, both Cleburne bnd J.W. involved

classes of people who were protected by various federal and state
statutes whereas the present classification of recoverying
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alcoholics and drug addicts have not received such treatment.
Thus, the Cleburne decision and J.W. decision have no
application to the facts of this case.
In Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh the court enjoined
the city from declaring a moratorium which would prohibit the
establishment of group homes for recovering alcoholics.

The

court there concluded that as long as permits were being issued
to other groups throughout the city that a discrimination had
occurred by singling out this particular group.

As noted

earlier, however, the court stated that it was a legitimate
concern for the city to require spacing between facilities.
Unlike Sullivan there has been no moratorium enacted in
Clearfield City against the establishment of these type of
facilities.

To the contrary, the new revised ordinances now

allow these facilities to be placed virtually anywhere in the
community.

There has been no denial of these type of homes as a

group but only as to the specific site requested by the County.
Thus, the Sullivan case is also not germane to this appeal.
As noted in the earlier section there is a rational basis
for denying this permit solely because of the proximity to the
existing treatment center.

This reason not only eliminates a

claim of arbitrariness and capriciousness but also satisfies all
consititutional requirements.

The lower court was therefore

incorrect in concluding that the statute had been applied in an
unconstitutional manner.
CONCLUSION
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This is not an equity case in which the findings of the
lower court should be affirmed in the absence of manifest error.
Rather, this is a case in which the lower court acting as a court
of appeals struck down a decision made by a body of individuals
duly elected by the residents of Clearfi^]Id City.

It is the

purpose of planning commissions and city councils to hear the
various concerns and interests of the cit|:izens and other
individuals in making zoning decisions.
As the Utah Supreme Court and numerous other courts have
observed, it is the very function and expertise of these type of
organizations that require deference to their decision unless
they were made with no rational basis and were made in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.

The lower court in this case

while acknowledging the standard of revie^ essentially concluded
that it was more important to establish a second facility at this
site than it was to allow the City to require this facility to be
built at another location.
As noted earlier there is a legitimate debate between
community planners as to whether it is best to concentrate these
type of facilities in one area or spread them throughout the
city.

There are valid reasons to support both positions.

It is

the fact that this issue is "debatable" that is the relevant
focus of the appeal rather than whetner one position is more
correct than the other.

The lower court instead of becoming a

reviewer of the decision making process stepped into the shoes of
the decision maker.

The court erred in concluding that the
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decision of the Council and Commission was arbitrary and
capricious.
Finally, the Court erred in concluding that the statutes had
been unconstitutionally applied.

There is no statute in this

case similar to those cases relied upon by Respondent nor is
there any policy of Clearfield City to exclude these facilities
from all parts of the city.

It is certainly a legitimate

function of the government to decide where these types of
facilities should be located unless there is a contrary mandate
from the state or federal government overriding this authority.
The lower court was therefore incorrect in holding an
unconstitutional application.
For these reasons, therefore, the decision of the lower
court should be reversed and the decision of the Council should
be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted this 15th

day of June, 1987.

Jraig S ^/Cook
Attorney for DefendantsAppellants
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